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Introduction
In  his celebrated  essay ‘M odernity: An Incom plete Project’Jü rgen  Haberm as 
addresses the issue o f how  aesthetic experience can be re in tegrated  into the 
life world. H e observes th a t
A lbrecht W ellmer has drawn my attention to one way that an aesthetic 
experience which is no t fram ed around the experts’ critical judgem ent 
of taste can have its significance altered: as soon as such an experience 
is used  to illum inate  a life-historical situation and is re la ted  to life 
problem s, it enters into a language game which is no longer that of the 
aesthetic  critic. T he aesthetic experience then  not only renews the 
in te rp re ta tio n  of ou r needs in whose light we perceive the world. It 
p e rm e a te s  as well o u r cognitive significations an d  o u r norm ative 
expectations and changes the m anner in which all these moments refer 
to one an o th er.1
H aberm as illustrates his p o in t by using an exam ple from  Peter Weiss’s 
The Aesthetics o f Resistance. Weiss describes a group o f young workers in Berlin 
in 1937, who, though  evening-classes acquire a knowledge o f the general 
a n d  social history o f E u ro p ean  art. H aberm as notes tha t
O ut of the resilient edifice of this objective mind, em bodied in works 
of art which they saw again and again in the museums in Berlin, they 
s ta r te d  rem o v in g  th e ir  own chips o f s tone , w hich they g a th ered  
to g e th e r an d  reassem bled  in the contex t o f their own milieu. This 
m ilieu was far rem oved from  that of traditional education as well as 
from  the then  existing regim e. These young workers went back and 
forth  betw een the edifice of European art and their own milieu until 
they were able to illum inate both.2
E ven if  we in te r p r e t  ‘ch ip s  o f  s to n e ’ h e re  in  b o th  a lite ra l an d  
m etaphorical sense, H aberm as’s exam ple is no t compelling. For to steal such 
chips o f s tone (or, in the  m etaphorical reading) fragm ents of art historical 
know ledge an d  to reassem ble them  in a d ifferen t context, is, a t best, a use 
o f art. Essentially found  objects are taken from their high art context in order
1 Jürgen Habermas ‘M odernity-An Incomplete Project’ included in Postmodern Culture, 
ed. Hal Foster, Pluto Press, London 1985, pp. 3-15. This reference, p. 13.
2 Habermas in Foster ibid. p. 13.
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to yield b ro ad er existential knowledge. W hy this shou ld  co u n t as aesthe tic  
experience is, alas, n o t clarified by H aberm as.
T he exam ple is, nevertheless, instructive in a m uch  b ro ad e r sense, bo th  
negatively  an d  positively. In  negative te rm s, th e  s tra teg y  e m b o d ie d  in 
H aberm as’s exam ple is one th a t p refigures the  lim its an d  u ltim ate  failure 
o f m uch conceptual art. Such art is putatively a m eans o f w resting m ean in g  
back form  the critic, and  investing it in the ideas o f the artist. I t appears even 
to  have a dem ocratising function  in th a t it allows th e  use o f — in p rin c ip le  -  
any m aterial, any object, all in all any m eans to get th e  a rtis t’s idea across. 
No ‘skills’ are necessary. H ence in its subversion o f  trad itional a rt m ethods, 
this seems an ideal way for specific individuals, social groups, and  (especially) 
m arginalised m inorities, to illum inate an d  declare th e ir experiences.
Such illu m in atio n  is, how ever, m assively re s tr ic ted . F o r w hilst the  
activities o f  the Berlin w orkers co n sid ered  by H aberm as (o r in d e e d  the 
activities o f m ost conceptual artists) may give the  p eo p le  co n ce rn ed  som e 
existential fulfilm ent, they do no m ore than  that. Such fulfilm ent is n o t only 
substantially non-aesthetic in ch arac te r, b u t also (since it lacks an  in te r- 
subjectively valid code o f articulation w hich w ould en ab le  it to illum inate 
m ore general contexts) it is hugely localised in charac ter. U nless the  artist 
ex p la in s  th e  in te n tio n  an d  s ig n ifican ce  o f  th e  o b je c t, its m e a n in g  is 
unavailable. T he road  is thus clear fo r the  critic to step  in. A nd this is the 
suprem e irony. O f all the artistic idiom s it is conceptually  based  ones w hich 
affirm the  hegem ony o f tha t insidious, priestly class o f  cu rato rs, critics, and  
art historians, who dom inate the con tem porary  a rt scene. If such works are 
to illum inate the life world in a g enu ine  objective sense, as o p p o sed  to the 
narrow  con tex t o f  their p o in t o f o rig ination , th en  they req u ire  a critic to 
speak for them  and  th rough  them .3
N ow it  m ig h t seem  th a t  th e  o n ly  a l te rn a t iv e  to  th is  is e q u a lly  
unaccep tab le . It w ould involve a reversion  to th e  trad itio n a l specia lised  
practices o f high art, and, accordingly, to m o d ern is t critical p ractices based 
on the prim acy o f form. However, this alternative is n o t inevitable.
We a re  led  th e re fo re  to th e  positive  im p lica tio n s  o f  H a b e rm a s ’s 
exam ple. It has two aspects. T he first is th a t if artistic form  is to be  a vital 
e lem ent in life world experience, it m ust have the capacity to offer aesthetic 
illum ination o f personal and  g roup situations. T h e  second  is the  possibility 
tha t this can be  achieved through the fragm entation  an d  reconfigu ra tion  o f 
the h istorical con tinuum . H aberm as seem s to see this as a m o re  d em o ­
3 A sustained critique of conceptual art can be found in Chapter 8 of my The Language  
o f Twentieth-Century Art: A  Conceptual History, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1997. See especially pp. 171-186.
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cratised  form  o f artistic activity. Indeed  it can be; b u t it does n o t have to be 
in o pposition  to the  m o re  specialist critical ju d g em en t o f taste. To see why 
th is is so, I shall, in  th e  re m a in d e r  o f this p ap e r, se t o u t the  basis o f a 
distinctive form  o f  a rt practice. Its origins ex tend  far back  in to the century  
with the  d eve lopm en t o f  pho tom ontage by Man Ray, Jo h n  H eartfield  and 
o thers. T h e  essence o f p h o tom on tage  is to com bine m ultip le photographs, 
an d  (som etim es) o th e r visual m aterial, into a single image. This can involve 
a sim ple ju x tap o sitio n  o f  pho tographs, o r the use of cutaway fragm ents o f 
p rin ts, in w hich la tte r case, we m ight justifiably speak o f photo-collage.
T h ere  is a crucial question  which m ust be asked ab o u t such a practice, 
nam ely does it m atte r th a t the  im age is derived solely from  pho tographs 
taken by the artist him  o r herself? T he verdict o f history so far has been , in 
practical term s, no. Artists working in this idiom  have, by and large, been  
willing to use photographs taken by both  themselves and others in composing 
the final im age. However, historical circum stances have changed. W hat if a 
form  o f photo-collage developed which was founded on  the convention that 
the photo-collage should  be com posed exclusively from  photographs taken 
by the artist? At first sight this m ight seem like an arbitrary stipulation abou t 
how photo-collage should  be done. But is not. Photo-collage is, like all visual 
idiom s, p red o m in an tly  an  a r t o f  spatial realisation. T h ere  is, however, also 
a tem poral d im ension , which in norm al photo-collage, is scattered. We find 
im ages taken by d iffe ren t peop le  com bining differen t places and  times. If 
all the com bined  p h o to g rap h s o r fragm ents thereof, are, in contrast, taken 
by one individual, w hat results is a com bination o f places and times which 
are  m om en ts from  the co n tin u u m  o f the artis t’s personal history. Visual 
aspects o f  events in an  individual life are m ade into an object. We m ight 
term  this form  o f photo-collage, accordingly, the ‘event-object’. Such objects
-  in their co n junction  o f im ages -  can be developed in a broadly surrealist 
idiom . However, the  m ore the final object is com posed from  fragm ents, or 
from  p h o to g rap h s disposed so as to mask their own figurative conten t, the 
m o re  it ap p ro x im a tes  to the  co n d itio n  o f abstract co n ten t, the m ore it 
approx im ates to the  co n d itio n  o f abstract o r sem i-abstract painting. This 
p a in te r ly  a b so rp tio n  o f  p h o to g rap h y  has a distinctive and  rem ark ab le  
ontology w hich achieves a k ind  o f philosophical illum ination. To show this, 
I will first clarify som e key characteristics which the Event-Object shares with 
p a in tin g  qua aesthetic  object, an d  will th en  go on to ou tline its distinctive 
inflections o f  these characteristics.
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Part One
Let m e begin with some general points abou t the n a tu re  o f the aesthetic 
object.4 T o perceive the world in any term s at all involves the  in te rac tio n  o f 
two m utually  d e p e n d e n t basic cognitive capacities -  u n d e rs ta n d in g  an d  
im a g in a tio n . In  th e  fo rm e r , s e n s ib le  p a r t ic u la r s  a re  s u b s u m e d  o r  
d isc rim in a ted  u n d e r  a c o n c e p t o r  co n c ep ts . W e have th e  b asic  a c t o f  
cognition. This act is only m ade possible, however, in  so far as it is in fo rm ed  
by the  im a g in a tio n ’s pow ers o f  a tte n t io n , re ca ll, a n d  p ro je c tio n . T h e  
generation  o f images enables us to re la te  an  im m ed ia te  ob ject o f  cogn ition  
to its past, fu ture, and  possible appearances. Im agination , in o th e r  w ords, 
in co n ju n c tio n  with th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g , serves to  stab ilise  th e  sensib le  
m anifold an d  organises it as a co h e ren t pe rcep tu a l system.
Most o f o u r perceptual judgem en ts can be characterised  as discursively 
rigid. They involve the  application o f defin ite  concep ts to defin ite  objects 
o n  th e  b asis  o f  d e f in i te  p ra c tic a l  in te re s ts  o r  p h y s io lo g ic a l n e e d s . 
U nderstand ing  and im agination are, in this con tex t, tightly b o u n d  by the 
following o f rules. However, there is one con tex t in w hich their co-operation  
is m uch freer. This is in the enjoym ent o f aesthetic form . In  such en joym en t 
we explore the different possibilities o f  s tructu re in the  way an object is m ade 
p resen t to the senses. A nd if the ob ject is an  artw ork, this m aking  p re sen t 
involves reference to needs, desires, fantasies and  values shared  by b o th  artist 
an d  au d ie n c e  alike by v irtue  o f  th e  co m m o n  c o n d it io n  o f  e m b o d ie d  
subjectivity.
T he im portance p f this is as follows. T he discursive rigidity o f  o rd inary  
cognition does n o t com e ready-made; it is achieved th ro u g h  the body’s active 
p o sitio n in g  in re la tio n  to  the p e rc e p tu a l field . In d e e d , o u r  p a r tic u la r  
cognitive acts are inform ed by a network o f m ore fundam ental concepts which 
originate in the body’s m ovem ents and  active m anipu lation  o f things. These 
concepts include figure and  g round , reality, neg a tio n  and  lim itation , an d  
unity, plurality and totality. T he en joym ent o f aesthetic  form  is o n e  w hich 
flows o u t from  these. R ather than  simply identifying the  form  as a ‘th is’ o r 
‘th a t’, we explore the d ifferent possibilities o f virtual structu re  w hich inform  
its appearance. U nderstanding and im agination in teract with relative freedom  
and  playfulness. They re tu rn  us to the  m obile orig ins o f p e rcep tio n , an d  
the very possibility o f conceptualisability.
Now qua aesthetic form  the Event-O bject shares in  all this. However, it 
does so in an  especially perspicacious way. This is because o f two factors.
4 For a full theory of the aesthetic object see Parts I and III of my A rt an d  Embodiment: 
From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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T h e  f irs t is th a t  p h o to g ra p h s  are  m ech an ica l re p ro d u c tio n s  o f  visual 
ex p e rien ce ; th e  seco n d  is that, in the Event-O bject, the  experiences in 
question  are the d irec t causal traces o f m om ents from  a specific p e rso n ’s 
individual life history. H ence, in our aesthetic exploration o f such an object, 
th e  virtual realities w hich it reconfigures are, in a sense, closer to  actual 
ex p erien ce  th an  are pa in tin g  o r natural forms. T here is a m ore d irec t and 
in tim ate  link  to  the  b e in g  o f the artist. T he events of seeing  which the artist 
has actually ex p e rien ced  -  his or h er past bodily positionings -  are woven 
in to  a fabric o f new appearance . Pain ting  and  o ther visual aesthetic idioms 
em body this in a tacit way; the  Event-Object -  insofar as we know it to be 
com posed  from  p h o to g rap h s taken by the artist -  makes this them atic.
O n  these term s, then , whilst all aesthetic form  involves the exploration 
o f structures o f appearance, the Event-Object m ore clearly locates the origins 
o f this s tructuring  -  o f percep tion  itself -  as a function o f the individual body, 
its cognitive capacities, an d  its positioning.
Now as well as engaging this d irect perceptual dim ension, our responses 
to artifactual aesthetic form s engage what I shall call the holistic structure o f 
experience . This consists in  the  fact that no  single m om en t in a h um an  life 
exists as an  isolated self- subsistent atom. Any presen t experience is given its 
specific ch a rac te r th ro u g h  the reciprocal relation betw een what is given in 
th a t ex p e rien ce  an d  a com plex  horizon com posed o f past experiences, our 
an ticipation  o f fu tu re  ones, and  our counterfactual sense o f alternative ways 
in w hich o u r life m igh t have developed. T he individual m om en t ‘con tains’ 
as it were, th e  w hole o f  o u r experience . A nd with each  new m o m en t o f 
experience , the charac te r o f the horizonal whole is modified. In the passage 
o f  life each individual m o m en t is con tingen t -  things in the past m ight have 
h a p p e n e d  d ifferen tly  an d  the  way o u r fu tu re  will u n fo ld  is a developing 
situation . However, once a m o m en t has gone in to  the past it is a necessary 
p a r t  o f w hat we are  in the present. Remove o r change any m om ent from  a 
p e rso n ’s past th en  th a t p e rso n ’s p resen t and  future are  also changed.
This holistic s tru c tu re  is one  of the necessary conditions o f the h um an  
m o d e o f  fin ite self-consciousness. It is, however, som eth ing  we are rarely 
aw are of, e x c ep t in  a p h ilo so p h ica l analysis such as this, or, indirectly , 
th ro u g h  the arts -  m ost notably th rough  painting. Aristotle no ted  the fact 
th a t mimesis has an  intrinsic fascination for hum an beings. He did n o t note, 
however, how the actual process of making is itself involved in this fascination. 
W hen  the p a in te r places brushstrokes on a surface, each new stroke is given 
its ch a rac te r n o t only by its own qualities b u t also by its relation  to those 
w hich  w en t b e fo re  it a n d  those  fu tu re  ones w hich th e  a rtis t m ig h t be  
anticipating. Reciprocally, this horizonal whole o f strokes in place and strokes
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which m igh t be m ade, is m odified by the  execu tion  o f  the  p re sen t stroke. 
O f course, areas m ight be pain ted  over an d  rew orked on  the basis o f this 
stroke, bu t, in  that case, its significance is changed . T h e  pain ting-over is a 
causal consequence of this decisive stroke, and  serves to aesthetically relocate 
it.
Now the im portan t p o in t to no te  is th a t this process exem plifies the  
holistic structu re  o f experience. This is because the  m aking  o f a p a in tin g  
ju s t is a successive series o f experiences in a p e rso n ’s life. It em bodies, and  
leaves the  traces o f a holistic structure . T hese traces, however, a re  n o t p a rt 
o f the a rtis t’s inner life; they are objectified, i.e. re n d e re d  in a publically  
accessible m edium . This gives them  a special significance. For it m eans th a t 
the p resen t in  which the pain ting  is com pleted , is, in p rincip le , e ternalised
-  along with all those o th er m om ents involved in th e  process o f  m aking. 
The painting marks an episode in the artist’s life which has now been  b ro u g h t 
to com pletion. O f course, any episode in a life can reach a culm inating point, 
b u t it is th en  absorbed in the on-going holistic d eve lopm en t o f a p e rso n ’s 
life history. In the painting, however, the episode attains a m ore fully realised 
c o m p le tio n  in th a t  it is e m b o d ie d  in  an  a r t i f a c t  w h ich  is p h y sica lly  
discontinuous from its creator. All the individually contingent m om ents which 
inform ed the work’s creation are now re n d e re d  necessary -  as p a r t o f the 
full id en tity  of the  fin ish ed  w ork. A n d  sin ce  th e  f in ish e d  w ork  exists 
independently  o f its creator, he o r she and, indeed, the audience can identify 
reflectively with this co m pleted  s tru c tu re  o f  ex p e rien ce , ra th e r  th a n  be  
im m ersed in the experiential flow o f m om ents.
T he painting also manifests the narrative s tru c tu re  o f  the  experien tia l 
flow. T h is is because , in  app ly ing  p a in t, th e  a r tis t  does so selectively . 
Previously execu ted  areas can be erased  o r m od ified  on  the  basis o f  the  
presen t stage of com position. Likewise in life, one com prehends and  defines 
o n e ’s p re se n t n o t as the sim ple co n seq u en ce  o f  o n e  past m o m e n t a fte r 
another, b u t ra ther selectively as an elem ent in an on-going narrative w herein 
som e m om ents o f the past are m ore im p o rtan t th an  an o th er. Significantly, 
however, whereas m uch o f ones past is simply fo rg o tten  -  an d  fo rg e ttin g  is 
an involuntary act -  the artist’s erasures an d  rew orkings are  voluntary. T hey 
allow the p resen t to regulate the past volitionally.
O n these term s, then , the pa in tin g  is n o t only an  ob ject o f  aesthetic  
pleasure in terms o f its structures o f appearance, it is so also -  an d  in a m uch 
d e e p e r  way -  th ro u g h  its co m p le tio n  an d  re f in e m e n t o f  s tru c tu re s  o f  
experience. T here is, however, a lim itation; and, again, it consists in  the fact 
that the pa in tin g ’s com pletion o f experience  is ind irect. T h e  evidence for 
this is m anifest in the way that, historically, p a in tin g  has b een  valued fo r the
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m essages o f its figurative co n ten t, o r for the beauties o f its form al qualities. 
T h e  aesthetic-onto logical d im ension  which I have iden tified  has scarcely 
figured  in  the exp lana tion  o f the  na tu re  o f our aesthetic responses to art. It 
has n o t b een  articu la ted  as a convention o f appreciation.
T h e  E v en t-O b jec t goes som e way tow ards rectify ing  this lack. In 
jux taposing  and  com posing photographs and fragments thereof, it manifestly 
exem plifies the structu res already alluded to. This is because, o f course, the 
pho tog raph ic  m aterial involves direct causal traces of the artist’s experience. 
It is com posed wholly from  such traces. The experiential structure link is here 
virtually inescapable. In  fact, it is taken one step further. In painting the work 
is com posed  in tem porally  linear terms. Even if one goes back in o rd e r to 
erase o r  rew ork, this ‘go ing  back ’ is actually m etaphorical. Literally, the 
e rasu re  o r rew orking is an o th e r stage forward in tem poral terms, from  the 
previous stages o f  work. In  the  Event-Object, however, the artist can use 
im ages from  the d istan t past o f his or h e r life on top o f images from  m ore 
recen t experience. Physically, and  in terms o f linear time, the far past images 
are h e re  m ore p re sen t th an  the m ore recen t ones. H ere, the linear time of 
the  actual process o f com position, is subverted by the form al assertiveness 
o f m ateria l from  the  d istan t past. And again this is, in an im portan t respect, 
tru e  to  th e  narrative stru c tu re  o f experience. For the p resen t is often given 
its ch a rac te r m ore  by events in the d istan t past, than it is by m ore recen t 
happenstances. Even m ore than  in painting, the tem porality o f the Event- 
O bjec t is genuinely  experien tia l.
We are left, then , with the  following situation. T he Event-Object uses 
p h o to g rap h s as i f  they were the  m aterial and  m eans for painting. But it is 
n o t pain ting , an d  n e ith e r is it a variety of photography. R ather it form s a 
symbolic m eans o f articulating experience which is inescapably photographic 
and  inescapably painterly, bu t which is reducible to neither. T he Event-Object 
is an  em erg en t a r t form  (in every sense) with its own distinctive properties.
N ow  as I m e n t io n e d  e a r l ie r ,  th e  E v en t-O b jec t is p re f ig u re d  by 
developm ents in p h o to m o n tag e  and  photo-collage from  earlier on in the 
century. But it has n o t been  systematically worked as a distinctive idiom. O ne 
reason  fo r this has b een  the facile progress, or, ra ther, lack o f progress of 
p h ilo so p h ic a l  ae s th e tic s . A m o re  s ig n ifican t re aso n  is th a t  h is to rica l 
circum stances have only now favoured its developm ent. I shall now address 
this factor in my final section.
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Part Two
R ecent times have been  charac terised  by a rh e to ric  o f  d eco n stru c tio n  
which affirm s such factors as the  instab ility  a n d  tran s ien ce  o f  m ean in g , 
relativity in values, and  the decen tredness o f the  self. Now w hilst it is true  
that there is a prevailing sensibility o f fragm entation  in  cu lture, the elem ents 
in the rh e to ric  w hich I have ju s t cited  are m ore  its surface m anifesta tions -  
in tellectual fashion -  ra th e r than  actual tru ths ab o u t o u r m o d e o f  insertion  
in  th e  w o rld .5 T h e  p ro b lem  fo r th em  is th a t  in stab ility , re la tiv ity  a n d  
decentredness, only m ake sense in the  co n tex t o f  a stable spatio-tem poral 
co n tin u u m  o f  re-identifiable ind ividual m ateria l item s. L anguage is the  
m eans o f re-identification in such a con tex t, an d  involves those pow ers o f 
und erstan d in g  an d  im agination w hich I a lluded  to  earlier.
Now, at first sight, the Event-Object as an  artistic idiom  seems very m uch  
o f  its tim e . T h is is b ec au se  its very  e s se n c e  invo lves p h o to g r a p h ic  
fragm entation  of the linear continuity  o f experience . However, as I show ed 
ea rlie r, this frag m en ta tio n  m anifests m u ch  d e e p e r  a n d  m o re  c o n s ta n t 
structures in perception  and  experience, to w hich the Event-O bject gives its 
own distinctive inflection. Indeed , the Event-O bject is also o f its tim e in  th a t 
it is n o t per se a high-art format. Anyone can cu t up  and  reconfigure snapshots 
so as to create objects with the experiential structures I have described. T hese 
co n sid era tio n s suggest th a t th e  E ven t-O bject w ould  satisfy H a b e rm a s’s 
dem ands o f the aesthetic -  that it should illum inate personal experience and  
situations, an d  n o t be the province o f  the specialist critic alone. This b e in g  
said, however, it is vital to em phasise tha t it is n o t an tagon istic  to critical 
practice culture. For whilst it is an easily accessible m edium , it can be re fined  
and  developed — perhaps in surprising  ways. K een-sighted critics can keep  
a b re a s t  o f  th ese  fac to rs , p o in t in g  o u t  r e p e t i t io n s ,  r e f in e m e n ts  a n d  
innovations, as well perform ing  m ore trad itional form al appraisals. T h e  fact 
that systematic pursuit o f the Event-Object as an  idiom  is new, indeed , m eans 
tha t the critic is m ore effectively p laced  in o rd e r to carry o u t these tasks. 
T here is less purely historical g ro u n d  w hich has to be m astered .
E arlie r on I m en tio n ed  how  th e  E vent-O bject is p h o to g ra p h ic  an d  
painterly b u t is neither photography n o r painting. It breaks down the barriers 
betw een these in a way that advances itself as a distinctive idiom , yet a t the  
sam e time, illum inates pho tography and  pain ting . In  respect o f  the fo rm er, 
fo r e x a m p le , w h ilst th e  sym bolic  fo rm  o f  m e c h a n ic a l ly - re p ro d u c e d  
representation  has been massively developed in the form  o f  filmic, televisual,
5 For a sustained critique of Derrida’s version of ‘deconstruction’ see Chapter One of 
my Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 25-39.
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an d  video images i.e. in the direction of tem poral realisation; its developm ent 
in  term s o f  static, m o re  spatial realisation has been m ore restricted. T he 
Event-O bject, however moves us in ju s t this direction. Again, through its use 
o f  pain terly  com positional m eans, it illum inates (in ways shown earlier) the 
exp erien tia l s tructu res which inform  the act o f painting.
I am  arguing, then , th a t the Event-Object is a m ore accessible m edium , 
yet o n e  w h ich  c o n tr ib u te s  to  spec ia list a r t  p ra c tice  precisely  th ro u g h  
overcom ing  som e o f th e  boundaries betw een two such practices.
L et m e now  conclude by developing the im plications o f this in relation 
to the co n n ectio n  o f ph ilosophy and  art. For a long tim e philosophers have 
c o n c e rn e d  them selves with problem s o f defin ition  in re lation to art per se, 
its ontological p roperties, and  the kind o f experiences which we have before 
us. D ebates on  the  defin itio n  o f art have, I think, led us nowhere. Form alist 
app roaches, fo r exam ple, have told us very little ab o u t why aesthetic form  
sh o u ld  be  so significant. In stitu tional definitions seek, in effect, to ratify 
any th ing  which artists choose to call art -  a strategy which, in effect, reduces 
art to m ere theory o r ideas whose connection with the a rt object only becomes 
m anifest w hen exp lained  linguistically by the artist, critic, o r curator. W hat 
is lost in b o th  app roaches is an  adequate accoun t o f why art has a history, 
why it shou ld  len d  itself to so m any d ifferen t uses; all in all why art answers 
a  distinctive n ee d  in  h u m an  beings.
W hat needs to be done , I would suggest, is as follows. We need to clarify 
the symbolic structures o f specific media, noting, in particular, the epistemic 
cond itions o f  th e ir legibility i.e. the way in which such symbolic structures 
a c q u ire  a c o m m u n icab le  m ean in g  w hich is n o t tied  to  accom panying  
explanations from  the artist o r critic. This means, in effect, a clarification of 
the possibility o f effective com m unicative codes. By revealing the sometimes 
o bscu re  o r  in d irec t ep istem ic conditions w hich sustain percep tion  o f art 
objects the  ph ilo so p h er enables these to henceforth  act as an  acknowledged 
an d  explicit conven tion  o f  reading. H e or she thus opens o u t the possibility 
o f new  com m unicative codes in art.
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